I work primarily within ethics. My current work pertains to questions about the epistemic condition of blameworthiness—questions about the conditions for ignorance excusing an agent from blame. In particular, I am interested in further exploring the way that the non-ideal agency of real agents and their non-ideal epistemic environments might mitigate, if not excuse, their moral ignorance. I am also interested in the intersection of epistemology and metaethics, especially the relation between interalist conceptions of epistemic justification and moral reasons for action.
“Difficulty and the Reasonable Expectation Account of Exculpating Ignorance,” The Journal of Ethics (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-023-09417-w
“Quality of Will Accounts and Non-Culpably Developed Mental Disorders,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22(3), September 2022
“Cognitive Biases, Ignorance, and Reasonable Expectations: An Argument for Reasonable Expectation Accounts as Revisionary”